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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to award prejudgment and postjudgment

interest where an interest rate is expressly specified in the subject contract? (Ex. 6; R. at
10,1f 2; R. at 253; R. at 295; R. at 363:240.) A trial court's decision on "entitlement to
prejudgment interest presents a question of law which we review for correctness."
Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "As such,
we accord no deference to the trial court's decision." Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App. 5,
Tf 23, 994 P.2d 817, 822. Similarly, "[w]e review the award of postjudgment interest, a
question of law, under the correction of error standard." Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 876
P.2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
2.

Did the trial court err in refusing to allow Ron Case Roofing to foreclose on

the subject real property to collect its judgment where there is a statutory remedy of
foreclosure? (R. at 296-97; R. at 363:241-42.) "We review questions of statutory
interpretation for correctness, giving no deference to the district court's interpretation."
Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, % 8, 94 P.3d 234, 236.
3.

Did the trial court err in awarding damages, in the form of an offset, for

damage to a ceiling and roofing deficiencies where there was no evidence presented to
iii

support such an award? (R. at 363:238.) A trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed
"for correctness, according them no deference." Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT
13,^|16,73P.3d325,329.
4.

Did the trial court err in reducing the award for additional sheeting

installation and materials from $1.59 per square foot to $1.25 per square foot where the
subject contract specifies $1.59 per square foot, the experts of both parties testified that
$1.59 per square foot was a reasonable cost for the installation and material, and there
was insufficient evidence presented supporting a finding of $1.25 per square foot? (R. at
363:237.) As noted in Issue 3, the standard of review for a trial court's legal conclusion
is correctness with no deference given to the trial court.
5.

On appeal, is Ron Case Roofing entitled to its attorney fees for its success

in appealing the above issues? This issue was not preserved at the trial court because it
solely relates to the appellate proceedings. Because this is solely an issue on appeal,
there is no standard of review. However, "[t]he general rule is that when a party who
received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees
reasonably incurred on appeal." Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). The trial court awarded Ron Case Roofing its reasonable attorney fees as the
prevailing party. (R. at 363:240.)
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions which are determinative as to the issues
raised.
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2005):
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10%
per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty or interest
charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations
made before May 14, 1981.
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (2005):
(1) As used in this section, "federal postjudgment interest rate" means the interest rate
established for the federal court system under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961, as amended.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a judgment rendered on a lawful contract
shall conform to the contract and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which
shall be specified in the judgment.
(b) A judgment rendered on a deferred deposit loan subject to Title 7, Chapter 23,
Check Cashing Registration Act, shall bear interest at the rate imposed under Subsection
(3) on an amount not exceeding the sum of:
(i) the total of the principal balance of the deferred deposit loan;
(ii) interest at the rate imposed by the deferred deposit loan agreement for a period
not exceeding 12 weeks as provided in Subsection 7-23-105(4);
(iii) costs;
(iv) attorney fees; and
(v) other amounts allowed by law and ordered by the court.
(3) (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, other civil and criminal judgments of the
v

district court and justice court shall bear interest at the federal postjudgment interest rate
as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%.
(b) The postjudgment interest rate in effect at the time of the judgment shall remain
the interest rate for the duration of the judgment.
(c) The interest on criminal judgments shall be calculated on the total amount of the
judgment.
(d) Interest paid on state revenue shall be deposited in accordance with Section 63A-8301.
(e) Interest paid on revenue to a county or municipality shall be paid to the general
fund of the county or municipality.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-15 (2005):
The court shall cause the property to be sold in satisfaction of the liens and costs as in the
case of foreclosure of mortgages, subject to the same right of redemption. If the proceeds
of sale after the payment of costs shall not be sufficient to satisfy the whole amount of
liens included in the decree, then such proceeds shall be paid in the order above
designated, and pro rata to the persons claiming in each class where the sum realized is
insufficient to pay the persons of such class in full. Any excess shall be paid to the owner.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (2005):
(1) Judgments shall continue for eight years from the date of entry in a court unless
previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance with
law.
(2) Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by Subsections (4) and (5), the entry of
judgment by a district court creates a lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor,
not exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the existence of the judgment,
located in the county in which the judgment is entered.
(3) An abstract of judgment issued by the court in which the judgment is entered may be
filed in any court of this state and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment
entered in that court.
(4) Prior to July 1, 1997, and after May 15, 1998, a judgment entered in the small claims
division of any court shall not qualify as a lien upon real property unless abstracted to the
vi

civil division of the district court and recorded in accordance with Subsection (3).
(5)(a) If any judgment is appealed, upon deposit, with the court where the notice of
appeal is filed, of cash or other security in a form and amount considered sufficient by the
court that rendered the judgment to secure the full amount of the judgment, together with
ongoing interest and any other anticipated damages or costs, including attorneys fees and
costs on appeal, the lien created by the judgment shall be terminated as provided in
Subsection (5)(b).
(b) Upon the deposit of sufficient security as provided in Subsection (5)(a), the court
shall enter an order terminating the lien created by the judgment and granting the
judgment creditor a perfected lien in the deposited security as of the date of the original
judgment.
(6)(a) A child support order or a sum certain judgment for past due support may be
enforced:
(i) within four years after the date the youngest child reaches majority; or
(ii) eight years from the date of entry of the sum certain judgment entered by a
tribunal.
(b) The longer period of duration shall apply in every order.
(c) A sum certain judgment may be renewed to extend the duration.
(7)(a) After July 1, 2002, a judgment entered by a district court or a justice court in the
state becomes a lien upon real property if:
(i) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment containing the information
identifying the judgment debtor as described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(4) is recorded
in the office of the county recorder; or
(ii) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment and a separate information statement
of the judgment creditor as described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(5) is recorded in the
office of the county recorder.
(b) The judgment shall run from the date of entry by the district court or justice court.
(c) The real property subject to the lien includes all the real property of the judgment
debtor:
(i) in the county in which the recording under Subsection (7)(a)(i) or (ii) occurs; and
(ii) owned or acquired at any time by the judgment debtor during the time the
judgment is effective.
(d) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirement of Subsection (7)(a).
vii

(8)(a) A judgment referred to in Subsection (7) shall be entered under the name of the
judgment debtor in the judgment index in the office of the county recorder as required in
Section 17-21-6.
(b) A judgment containing a legal description shall also be abstracted in the appropriate
tract index in the office of the county recorder.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

NATURE OF THE CASE
The dispute between Plaintiff/Appellant, Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving,

L.L.C. ("Ron Case Roofing"), and Defendants/Appellees, Clarence Gene Sturzenegger
and Peggy Ann Sturzenegger ("Sturzenegger"), relates to work Ron Case Roofing
performed on the Sturzenegger single-family dwelling located at approximately 1849
East 5600 South in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and further described
as LOT 1, LAKEWOOD # 6 SUB., Parcel No. 22-16-206-011-0000 ("Project" or
"Property") and Sturzenegger's failure to pay for the work Ron Case Roofing performed.
The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Ron Case Roofing and against
Sturzenegger on October 13, 2005. From that entry of judgment, Ron Case Roofing now
appeals.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL
COURT
Ron Case Roofing commenced the action on October 17, 2003, against

Sturzenegger and a trial was held. On October 13, 2005, the trial court entered final
judgment in favor of Ron Case Roofing and against Sturzenegger as follows:
Principal
Costs
Attorney Fees
Total Judgment

$10,264.00
$487.65
$10,000.00
$20,751.65

Accordingly, the trial court determined that Ron Case Roofing was the prevailing party.
On October 20, 2005, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), Ron Case
Roofing moved the trial court to amend the amount of attorney fees awarded in the final
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judgment, which stayed the time for filing this appeal under Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(b). The trial court held a hearing to consider Ron Case Roofing's motion on
January 9, 2006. The trial court denied the motion and allowed the final judgment to
stand.
This appeal is from the Final Judgment entered October 13, 2005. Ron Case
Roofing filed its Notice of Appeal in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, on January 25, 2006. On February 15, 2006, Ron Case Roofing filed its Docketing
Statement with the Utah Court of Appeals.
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Contract

1.

In or about November 2002, Stuzenegger solicited a proposal from Ron

Case Roofing for roofing services for the Property. (R. at 240, ^f 6.)
2.

On or about November 19, 2002, Shain Case, a representative of Ron Case

Roofing, met with Sturzenegger. (R. at 240, Tf 7.)
3.

During the meeting, Shain Case prepared "Proposal and Contract No.

3R3074S" for work to be performed at the Property (the "Contract"), a copy of which
was left with Sturzenegger for her review and execution. (Ex. 6; R. at 9-10; R. at 240, Tf
9.) The Contract was admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 6. (R. at 363:20.)
4.

The Contract is "fairly straightforward." (R. at 240, \ 10; R. 363:234.)

5.

The roofing services identified on the Contract included removal of the

existing roofing membrane to the roof deck, installation of a new built-up tar and gravel
roof system, installation of new aluminum gutters and downspouts, installation of new
2

high rise gravity vents, and installation of a new gravel stop (the "Work"). (Ex. 6; R. at
9; R. at 240,1(11.)
6.

Pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case Roofing agreed to perform the Work for

the Original Price of $12,450.00. (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R. at 253, H 2.)
7.

Pursuant to the Contract, Sturzenegger agreed to pay the amount of

$12,450.00 for the Work. (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R. at 253, % 3.)
8.

In addition to the Work, the Contract provided for contingencies, including:
a.

If the existing substrate needed new sheeting, Sturzenegger agreed to

pay $1.59 per square foot for the replacement of the same. (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R. at
254,1J4B.)
b.

If there were problems requiring extra work, and Ron Case Roofing

was unable to contact Sturzenegger, Sturzenegger agreed that Ron Case Roofing
could proceed with the work, using its best judgment, and Sturzenegger agreed to
pay for any such work so performed. (Ex. 6; R. at 10, f 13; R. at 254, *| 4C.)
9.

The contingencies, if encountered, would increase the Original Price. (R. at

241,1(14.)
10.

Sturzenegger did not invite Ron Case Roofing to inspect the interior of the

Property and did not inform Ron Case Roofing that her master bedroom had an exposed
vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling. (R. at 241, ^ 16.)
11.

After having the Contract in her possession for approximately five months,

on or about April 14, 2003, Sturzenegger signed the Contract. (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R. at 241,
1117, 19.)

B.

The Sheeting

12.

On or about April 22, 2003, Ron Case Roofing mobilized at the Property

and began its work under the Contract. (R. at 242, ^ 24.)
13.

Upon removal of the tar and gravel roofing systems, Ron Case Roofing

observed the existing roof deck and its condition. (R. at 244, \ 44.)
14.

Ron Case Roofing determined that the existing roof deck was in

unsatisfactory condition for installation of the new built-up tar and gravel roof system.
(R. at 244, % 45.)
15.

The International Building Code, which Utah adopted, provides at section

1510.2 that "Structural roof components shall be capable of supporting the roof-covering
system and the material and equipment loads that will be encountered during installation
of the system." (R. at 244, ^ 46.)
16.

At the time of this determination, Sturzenegger was not at the Property and

could not be otherwise contacted because she was in Hawaii and had not left any contact
information with Ron Case Roofing. (R. at 245,fflf47, 49.)
17.

At the time of this determination, no one having information on

Sturzenegger's whereabouts was at the Property. (R. at 245, If 48.)
18.

At no time while performing the Work did Ron Case Roofing have a

telephone number where Sturzenegger could be reached or any other means of contacting
her. (R. at 245, If 49.)
19.

Because Sturzenegger was unavailable, Shain Case, of Ron Case Roofing,

took photographs of the roof, using a digital camera, so that Ron Case Roofing could
4

show Sturzenegger that the substrate was in poor condition and in need of new sheeting.
(R. at 245,1(51.)
20.

Ron Case Roofing's foreman was present when the photographs of the roof

at the Property were taken. (R. at 245, % 52.)
21.

Provision 13 of the Contract provides:

If a problem should arise and workmen cannot contact Customer,
Contractor will proceed with job utilizing Contractor's best judgment. In
the event that additional costs are incurred by Contractor under these
circumstances, Customer authorizes Contractor to proceed with the project
and agrees to pay any increase in costs.
(Ex. 6; R. at 10, If 13; R. at 245,1j 50.)
22.

Ron Case Roofing, using its best judgment, determined that the substrate

needed new sheeting to support the new built-up tar and gravel roof system and the
material and equipment loads that would be encountered during the installation of the
system. (R. at 245, f 53.)
23.

Ron Case Roofing installed new 7/16" OSB sheeting over the existing roof

deck, which provided a satisfactory roof deck surface for installation of the new built-up
tar and gravel roof system. (R. at 246, % 54.)
24.

The terms of the Contract provide in pertinent part: "Sheeting will be

inspected for damage and replaced if needed at $1.59 per square foot." (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R.
at 246, K 55.)
25.

At trial, Dan Holland, the expert for Ron Case Roofing, testified that $1.59

per square foot was a reasonable amount to be charged for the sheeting. (R. at 246, f 56.)
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26.

At trial, Kraig Clawson, the expert for Sturzenegger, testified that $1.59 per

square foot was on the high end of a reasonable amount to be charged for the sheeting.
(R. at 246, If 56; R. at 363:217-18, 228-29.)
27.

At trial, Mr. Clawson also testified that if one were to contract with a

roofing contractor for replacement of the sheeting over an entire roof deck, the price
would not typically be $1.59 per square foot, but he did not provide any further cost
figures as to this issue. (R. at 363:218.)
28.

The installation of the sheeting increased the Original Price, as the Contract

provides. (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R. at 247,fflj59-60.)
29.

On or about Friday, April 25, 2003, Ron Case Roofing completed the work

pursuant to the terms of the Contract. (R. at 247, Tj 61.)
C

The Master Bedroom Damage

30.

The master bedroom of the Property had an exposed vaulted, wood, tongue-

and-groove ceiling. (R. at 248, f 66.)
31.

As explained above, Sturzenegger did not inform Ron Case Roofing that

she had an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling in her master bedroom. (R. at
249, U 67.)
32.

Sturzenegger also did not invite Ron Case Roofing to inspect the interior of

the Property. (R. at 249, ^ 68.)
33.

Provision 19 of the Contract provides in pertinent part:

Unless Customer requests Contractor's employee to inspect the interior
surfaces of the building before roofing is commenced by Contractor it will
be assumed that the interior damages were caused prior to commencement
6

of roof work by Contractor and owner agrees to hold Contractor harmless
for such damages.
(Ex. 6; R. at 10, f 19; R. at 249, f 69.)
34.

When Ron Case Roofing personnel inspected the roof of the Property, they

had no reason to know that there was an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling over
the master bedroom. (R. at 249, % 70.)
35.

Most homes have insulation above the ceiling. The insulation is typically

installed in the interior of the home in the void under the roof substrate and above the
ceiling. With an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling, there is no such void.
Consequently, there is typically a layer of rigid insulation installed on the exterior of the
home over the top of the roofs substrate. (R. at 249, ^j 71.)
36.

The Property did not have a layer of insulation on the roof over the master

bedroom. (R. at 249, f 72.)
37.

The nails used for installation of the new sheeting pierced the master

bedroom ceiling. (R. at 250, Tf 73.)
38.

When Ron Case Roofing began installing a new roof vent, it cut through

the master bedroom ceiling and discovered that the master bedroom had an exposed
vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling. (R. at 250, f 74.)
39.

On or about April 25, 2003, Sturzenegger returned to the Property and saw

the condition of the master bedroom ceiling. (R. at 250, ^ 75.)
40.

Sturzenegger contacted Shain Case regarding the condition of the master

bedroom ceiling. (R. at 250, ^ 76.)
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41.

Provision 17 of the Contract states in pertinent part that if there is "[a]ny

damage caused by Contractor for which Contractor may be liable . . . , Contractor shall be
given first opportunity to repair said damage before other Contractors are retained by
owner." (Ex. 6; R. at 10, U 17; R. at 250, f 77.)
42.

On or about June 13, 2003, Ron Case Roofing, through counsel and by

letter, communicated to Sturzenegger's attorney, its readiness and willingness to repair
the master bedroom ceiling pursuant to provision 17 of the Contract. (R. at 250, ^ 78.)
The letter was admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 12. (R. 363:35.)
43.

Ron Case Roofing suggested several options for repairing the master

bedroom ceiling. (R. at 250, % 79.)
44.

Ron Case Roofing estimated that its cost to repair the master bedroom

ceiling would be $ 1,500.00. (R. at 251, % 80.)
45.

Sturzenegger refused to allow Ron Case Roofing to make any repairs to the

master bedroom ceiling. (R. at 251, ^ 81.)
46.

Sturzenegger also refused to allow Ron Case Roofing to perform any clean-

up work related to the master bedroom ceiling. (R. at 251, ^j 82.)
47.

On or about July 29, 2003, Sturzenegger contracted with Scorpion of Salt

Lake ("Scorpion") to make repairs to the master bedroom ceiling in exchange for
payment in the amount of $3,000.00. (R. at 251, ^ 83.)
48.

Provision 16 of the Contract provides that "[n]o cost of service, materials,

or goods supplied by owner or owner's agent, Contractor, or employees shall be charged
back against Contractor's invoice, unless such services, goods, or materials were
8

furnished to Contractor or its employees, pursuant to Purchase Order issued by
Contractor." (Ex. 6; R. at 10, If 16; R. at 251, % 84.)
49.

Sturzenegger never requested a Purchase Order from Ron Case Roofing for

use of Scorpion to repair the master bedroom ceiling, and a Purchase Order was never
issued by Ron Case Roofing for such. (R. at 251, f 85.)
50.

On or about July 29, 2003, Scorpion of Salt Lake made the repairs to the

master bedroom ceiling. (R. at 251, ^f 86.)
51.

At trial, Ron Case Roofing remained willing to deduct its estimated cost of

$1,500.00 from the outstanding contract balance for the master bedroom ceiling repairs.
(R. at 251, f 87.)
D.

The Mechanic's Lien

52.

On or about April 25, 2003, Shain Case provided to Sturzenegger a billing

statement (the "Billing Statement"), which states a balance due of $16,578.00. (R. at
248,ffif62-63.) The Billing Statement was admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit No.
10. (R. 363:30.)
53.

Sturzenegger has not paid to Ron Case Roofing any of the balance due of

$16,578.00. (R. at 248, Tf 64.)
54.

Sturzenegger admitted in her Answer to Ron Case Roofing's Complaint

that monies are owed to Ron Case Roofing for the Work. (R. at 20, f 22; R. at 248, f 65.)
55.

Because Ron Case Roofing was not paid in full for the Billing Statement

and the work it had performed at the Property, it caused a Notice of Mechanic's Lien to
be filed against the Property (the "Lien"). (R. at 12; R. at 252, f 93.)
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56.

The Lien was recorded on June 13, 2003. (R. at 12; R. at 252, % 94.)

57.

The Lien was mailed to Sturzenegger, by certified mail, at the Property on

June 13, 2003. (R. at 253, % 95.)
58.

Sturzenegger received the certified mailing at the Property and on or about

June 18, 2003. (R. at 253, ^ 96.)
E.

Prejudgment and Postjudgement Interest

59.

Provision 2 of the Contract states in pertinent part that "[i]n the event

payments are not timely made, a finance charge of 3% per month will be charged on the
unpaid balance from the date of completion to the date of payment before and after
judgment." (Ex. 6; R. at 10, f 2; R. at 9; R. at 253, f 97.)
F.

Attorney Fees and Costs

60.

Provision 2 of the Contract states in pertinent part that "Customer agrees to

pay all cost of collection and attorney's fees after default and referral to attorney and
further agrees to pay after judgment costs of collection." (Ex. 6; R. at 10, \ 2; R. at 253,

1198.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This Court should reverse the trial court for at least four reasons. First, because a
creditor is entitled to interest as a matter of law and the Contract between Ron Case
Roofing and Sturzenegger specified a rate at which interest would accrue, the trial court
erred in not awarding Ron Case Roofing prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the
rate to which the parties agreed in the Contract. Statutory law, case law, and public
policy support this award of interest at the rate specified in the Contract.
10

Second, the trial court erred in prohibiting Ron Case Roofing from foreclosing on
the Lien to collect on its judgment against Sturzenegger. Foreclosure for mechanic's
liens is a statutory creation and nondiscretionary, which the trial court improperly
ignored.
Third, there was no evidence presented at trial to support Sturzenegger's claim of
damages from ceiling damage and roofing deficiencies. Sufficient evidence is required
for the trial court's legal conclusion. Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding
Sturzenegger damages in the form of an offset against Ron Case Roofing's award.
Fourth, the trial court erred in changing the express provision of the contract
related to replacement material and installation costs. There was no evidence presented
at trial to support the trial court's legal conclusion and interference with the clear and
unambiguous language of the contract to which the parties agreed.
Finally, the trial court's award of attorney fees should be increased to account for
Ron Case Roofing's additional success on appeal. Ron Case Roofing also is entitled to
its attorney fees and costs on appeal because its action arises from the construction
contract, which provides for an award of fees to the prevailing party. Therefore, this
Court should reverse the trial court and enter judgment as to these matters in favor of Ron
Case Roofing and against Sturzenegger.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD RON CASE
ROOFING INTEREST AT THE RATE SPECIFIED IN THE CONTRACT
BECAUSE IT IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST AS A MATTER OF LAW.
This Court should reverse the trial court and award Ron Case Roofing

prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the rate specified in the contract because a
creditor is entitled to interest as a matter of law and Ron Case Roofing and Sturzenegger
agreed to a specific interest rate in the Contract. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
in "contract cases/' "interest on amounts found to be due injudicial proceedings is
recovery to which the creditor is entitled as a matter of law." Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d
800, 809 (Utah 1979). The instant case is a "contract case" because the action included
enforcement of a construction contract, and the trial court found that Ron Case Roofing is
due monies on the Contract in the principal amount of $10,264.00. Thus, Ron Case
Roofing is entitled to recover interest on that amount as a matter of law.
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated with approval that "'interest as the parties
to a contract have agreed upon as part of their contract. . . is as much an integral part of
the debt as the principal itself. . . ."' Farnworth v. Jensen, 217 P.2d 571, 575 (Utah
1950) (quoting 30 Am. Jur. Trials § 2 (1950)). In support of the rate to which parties to a
contract may agree, Utah law provides that "[t]he parties to a lawful contract may agree
upon any rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in
action that is the subject of their contract." Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(1) (2005). Here,
the parties agreed in their valid and lawful Contract that "[i]n the event payments are not
timely made, a finance charge of 3% per month will be charged on the unpaid balance
12

from the date of completion to the date of payment before and after judgment." (Ex. 6;
R. at 10, f 2; R. at 253, f 97.) Therefore, interest should accrue at the rate of thirty-six
percent per annum prejudgment and postjudgment from April 26, 2003, because, as the
Contract reflects, that is what the parties agreed to.
A.

Prejudgment interest

An award of prejudgment interest is proper when "the damage is complete, the
loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a
particular time." Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). However, u a court may only award prejudgment interest if damages are
calculable within a mathematical certainty." Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App. 5, % 24,
994 P.2d 817, 823. Here, the damage is complete because Ron Case Roofing completed
its work on the Property and Sturzenegger has not paid Ron Case Roofing for the work.
The loss can be measured by facts and figures because it is a dollar amount. Finally, the
loss is fixed as of a particular time because Sturzenegger was obligated and failed to pay
Ron Case Roofing upon completion of its work on April 25, 2003.
The award of prejudgment interest is also supported by public policy, because "an
award of prejudgment interest simply serves to compensate a party for the depreciating
value of the amount owed over time and, as a corollary, deters parties from intentionally
withholding an amount that is liquidated and owing." Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah
Div. of State Lands & Forestry. 921 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Utah 1996). From the start of this
action, Sturzenegger admitted that an amount was owing to Ron Case Roofing. (R. at 20,
% 22; R. at 248, ^ 65.) Nevertheless, Sturzenegger intentionally withheld this admitted
13

amount as well as the amount the trial court found was owing. It was clearly contrary to
public policy for the trial court to not award Ron Case Roofing prejudgment interest on
the amounts owed under the Contract. Prejudgment interest is proper in this matter and
should be awarded.
B.

Postjudgment interest

Utah Code section 15-1-4 states in pertinent part that "a judgment rendered on a
lawful contract shall conform to the contract and shall bear the interest agreed upon by
the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment." Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-4(2)(a)
(2005). As discussed above, the parties agreed to the interest rate of thirty-six percent per
annum for postjudgment interest in their lawful contract. (R. at 10, % 2; R. at 253, f 97.)
Accordingly, postjudgment interest should accrue at this rate as the statute provides.
Sturzenegger will likely argue that she has paid the amount of the judgment to the
trial court and, accordingly, postjudgment interest should not accrue beyond the date of
the payment. This argument is without merit because Sturzenegger's "payment" is
conditional and was not delivered to Ron Case Roofing.1 To accept this "payment,"
Sturzenegger requires that Ron Case Roofing satisfy the judgment and dismiss its appeal,
together with relinquishment of the associated rights. If Sturzenegger truly wanted to
avoid the accrual of postjudgment interest, she should have made an unconditional
payment of the judgment amount. Without either of these actions and by conditioning

*The letter of January 12, 2006, from Jason H. Robinson, attorney for Ron Case Roofing,
to Tyler B. Ayres, attorney for Sturzenegger, describes the conditions on the monies
deposited with the trial court. (R. at 344-45.)
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payment to the trial court, Sturzenegger has not made satisfactory payment to Ron Case
Roofing and postjudgment interest should continue to accrue.
In conclusion, interest should accrue at the rate specified in the Contract because
Ron Case Roofing is entitled to interest as a matter of law, the parties agreed to this rate
of interest, and the award of prejudgment and postjudgment interest is supported by
statutory law, case law, and public policy.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW RON CASE
ROOFING TO FORECLOSE ON THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY TO
COLLECT ITS JUDGMENT WHERE FORECLOSURE IS A
STATUTORY RIGHT AND CREATION.
This Court should reverse the trial court's limitation on foreclosure because Ron

Case Roofing is statutorily entitled to foreclose on its mechanic's lien, and alternately,
judgment liens, as statutory creations, cannot be limited in their enforceability. The Utah
mechanic's lien statute provides that, without discretion, "[t]he court shall cause the
property to be sold in satisfaction of the liens and costs as in the case of foreclosure of
mortgages, subject to the same right of redemption." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-15 (2005)
(emphasis added). Ron Case Roofing had a valid and enforceable mechanic's lien on the
Property. The Lien was properly recorded on June 13, 2003. (R. at 252,194.) On June
13, 2003, the Lien was mailed to Sturzenegger, by certified mail. (R. at 253,196.) The
trial court noted that the Lien was proper. (R. at 363:127-28.) Accordingly, Ron Case
Roofing is entitled to foreclose on the Lien pursuant to Utah Code section 38-1-15.
Nevertheless, despite the nondiscretionary statutory language that directed the trial court
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to cause the Property to be sold to satisfy the Lien, the trial court refused to do so. (R. at
363:241-42.)
Instead of allowing foreclosure of the Property to satisfy Ron Case Roofing's
Lien, the trial court awarded Ron Case Roofing a judgment lien but prohibited Ron Case
Roofing from executing on that lien against the Property. (R. at 296-97; R. at 363:24142.) For that reason, even if Ron Case Roofing cannot foreclose on its mechanic's lien,
Ron Case Roofing should be allowed to execute on its judgment lien. The judgment lien
statute provides that "a judgment entered by a district court or a justice court in the state
becomes a lien upon real property" if the recording and filing requirements of the
subsection are met. Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-l(7)(a) (2005). The Utah Supreme Court
has further explained that "[a] judgment lien provides a judgment creditor with a means
of satisfying a judgment from a judgment debtor's real property." Diversified Holdings,
L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, f 40, 63 P.3d 686, 702. It "may be enforced by writ of
execution, levy, and sale . . . ." Id Furthermore, it "is a creature of statute, and it is for
the legislature to alter the terms of its creation and termination." IcL at ^f 47, 63 P.3d at
705. In the present matter, the trial court ignored the statutory effect of a judgment lien
and denied Ron Case Roofing's right to execute on its judgment.
Sturzenegger will likely argue that foreclosure on the mechanic's lien or the
judgment lien is not required because she made "payment" in the amount of the judgment
to the trial court. Again, this argument is without merit because Sturzenegger's
"payment" is conditional and was not delivered to Ron Case Roofing. (R. at 344-45.)
Furthermore, an increase in the award to Ron Case Roofing by success on appeal
16

necessitates having foreclosure as a mechanism for obtaining relief. Sturzenegger's
payment to the trial court will not satisfy the additional award, and there is no guarantee
that Sturzenegger will voluntarily pay the additional amount.
This Court should reverse the trial court and allow Ron Case Roofing to foreclose
on its Lien on the Property pursuant to the Utah mechanic's lien statute. The Court
should allow Ron Case Roofing to foreclose on the judgment lien the trial court awarded.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING STURZENEGGER
DAMAGES IN THE FORM OF OFFSETS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE
DID NOT SUPPORT THIS LEGAL CONCLUSION.
This Court should reverse the trial court's award of offsets to Sturzenegger for

ceiling damages and deficiencies in the new roof construction because there was no
evidence presented as to the amount of damages sustained in support of the trial court's
legal conclusion. The Utah Supreme Court has explained that to prove damages, a party
must prove (1) "the fact of damages" and (2) "the amount of damages." Atkin Wright &
Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985). In measuring
the damages, the claimant has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the cost of the
repairs. 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 144. There "must be evidence that rises above speculation
and provides a reasonable . . . estimate of damages." Atkin Wright, 709 P.2d at 336. In
Atkin Wright, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the jury's award of damages because the
party claiming damages, while offering sufficient proof of the fact of damages, failed to
offer sufficient proof of the amount of its damages. Id at 337. Similarly, in the case now
before the Court, Sturzenegger offered insufficient evidence as to the amount of damages
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she sustained from the damage to her master bedroom ceiling and defects in the
construction of the new roof.
A.

Master Bedroom Ceiling Damage

Pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case Roofing had a right to repair the damage to
Sturzenegger's master bedroom ceiling, which it requested to do. (Ex. 6; R. at 10, ^ 17;
R. at 250, Tf 77; R. at 256,fflf15-16.) Despite this request, Sturzenegger refused to allow
Ron Case Roofing to repair the damage. (R. at 256, Tf 17; R. at 363:137.) Instead,
Sturzenegger went off and did her own thing by hiring Scorpion to make the repairs. (R.
at 256, Tf 18.) Sturzenegger would not even have allowed Ron Case Roofing to pay
Scorpion directly. (R. at 363:209). Nevertheless, Shain Case of Ron Case Roofing
testified that it would cost Ron Case Roofing about $1,500 to make the repairs to the
master bedroom ceiling, and it gave Sturzenegger this amount as an offset against its
claims. (R. at 363:34-35.)
The only testimony related to the amount paid for the repair of the damage to the
master bedroom ceiling was that Sturzenegger testified that she paid $3,000 to Scorpion.
(R. at 363:138.) Kraig Clawson, Sturzenegger's expert witness, did not testify as to the
amount of damage in dollars the master bedroom ceiling sustained or the reasonableness
of the $3,000 payment for the repairs. (R. at 363:214-31.) He only testified that, in his
opinion, it would not be workmanlike for Ron Case Roofing to puncture the master
bedroom ceiling. (R. at 363:223-24.) It is most telling that the trial court even stated in
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that "[tjhere was no evidence presented at
trial that the $3,000.00" Sturzenegger paid "was a reasonable amount." (R. at 256, ^ 19.)
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Despite the lack of evidence to support its legal conclusion as an award of
damages, the trial court improperly awarded Sturzenegger an offset of $2,400 using, as
the trial court termed it, "Kentucky windage numbers"2 to reach its conclusion. (R. at
256, % 20.) A payment alone should not be sufficient evidence or measure of the amount
of damages. If it was, any amount of payment, no matter how grossly excessive, would
entitle Sturzenegger to an offset. Sturzenegger simply failed to prove the reasonableness
of her payment to Scorpion and the amount of damages related to the ceiling damage.
The trial court's award of an offset to Sturzenegger for the master bedroom ceiling
damage without evidence of the dollar value of that damage and its repair was incorrect.
B.

Roof Deficiencies

The trial court found that there were certain deficiencies with the roof system Ron
Case Roofing installed at the Property. (R. at 257, If 21.) Mr. Clawson testified that he
was able to form an opinion, to a limited extent, as to the workmanship of Ron Case
Roofing's work. (R. at 363:223.) Mr. Clawson took issue with the adequacy of certain
areas of the asphalt and the damage to the master bedroom ceiling. (R. at 363:223-24.)
The trial court also noted that from Mr. Clawson's report and photographs that additional
deficiencies include slippage, lack of facing or flashing in certain areas, tar dripping,
laminated fabric, flashing not sealed, improper base flashing nailing, and "some other

"Kentucky windage" is slang that "sheds an image of indecision that is opportunistically
resolved with licking one's forefinger and allowing the direction of a prevailing wind to
settle an issue. In less political correct phraseology the odious approach allows for taking
advantage of circumstance with little or no concern for principal or consequence." Joe
Vella, Kentucky Windage, http.V/www.searchmalta.com/ezine/mouse/kentucy.shtml (last
visited May 24, 2006).
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things." (R. at 363:239.) While Ron Case Roofing does not challenge these findings, it
does challenge the lack of evidence on which the trial court supported it award to
Sturzenegger of an offset for these deficiencies.
Mr. Clawson did not testify as to the dollar value of any of these deficiencies. (R.
at 214-31.) Like the damage to the master bedroom ceiling, it is again telling that the
trial court stated in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that "[t]here was no
evidence presented at trial as to the dollar value of the deficiencies." (R. at 257, Tf 22.)
However, once again, despite the lack of any evidence to support an award of damages
for roof deficiencies, the trial court improperly awarded Sturzenegger an offset of $1,500.
(R. at 257, Tf 23.) Again, the trial court used "Kentucky windage numbers" to reach its
improper legal conclusion. (R. at 256, f 23.) The offset award to Sturzenegger for the
roofing deficiencies was incorrect without any evidence of the amount of damages from
those deficiencies.
In sum, the trial court's legal conclusion of an award of speculative offsets despite
there being no evidence as to the amount of Sturzenegger's damages for the repair of the
bedroom ceiling and the roofing deficiencies was incorrect and should be reversed.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CHANGING AN EXPRESS PROVISION
OF THE CONTRACT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR
AN INTERFERENCE WITH THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS
LANGUAGE TO WHICH THE PARTIES AGREED.
This Court should reverse the trial court's legal conclusion of a different material

cost than that to which the parties agreed and for which the express terms of the Contract
provide because the Contract was integrated and unambiguous, making judicial
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interference with the terms of the contract improper. "The purpose of a written contract
is to put in definite and evidentiary form the terms upon which the minds of the parties to
the contract have met." Erickson v. Bastian, 102 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1940). In
evaluating the written contract, the court "must first ascertain whether the contract was
integrated and second whether it was ambiguous." Bailey-Allen, 876 P.2d at 424. The
Contract satisfies both of these requirements. First, the front side of the Contract
provides that "[t]his document, including the provisions on the reverse hereof, when
executed constitutes a binding and the total agreement." (Ex. 6; R. at 9.) Therefore, the
Contract, which was executed by the parties, was integrated. Second, the trial court
found that "the Contract is fairly straight forward." (R. at 240, ^J 10.) Consequently, the
second requirement regarding ambiguity is satisfied. Ultimately, "where the parties have
made an express contract, the court should not find a different one by 'implication'
concerning the same subject matter if the evidence does not justify [such] an
interference." Ted R. Brown & Assocs., Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 970 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Evidence that would
support interference would include, for example, waiver or modification. See id. Thus,
despite claims of unfairness by one party, courts "cannot 'alter the rights agreed to by the
parties' by appeal to a more general sense of fairness." Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003
UT App 201, f 22, 71 P.3d 188, 194-95 (quoting Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc.. 844 P.2d
331, 335 (Utah 1992)). Unfortunately, in the matter now before the Court, the trial court
interfered with the express provisions of the Contract without evidential support for such
an interference.
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The evidence before the trial court showed that upon removal of the tar and gravel
roofing systems, Ron Case Roofing observed the existing roof deck and its condition. (R.
at 244, Tf 44.) Ron Case Roofing determined that the existing roof deck was in
unsatisfactory condition for installation of the new built-up tar and gravel roof system.
(R. at 244, % 45.) The International Building Code, which Utah has adopted, requires that
"[structural roof components shall be capable of supporting the roof-covering system
and the material and equipment loads that will be encountered during installation of the
system." (R. at 244, ^ 46.)
At the time of this determination, Sturzenegger was not at the Property and could
not be otherwise contacted because she was in Hawaii and had not left any contact
information with Ron Case Roofing. (R. at 245, ^ 47, 49.) Furthermore, no one having
information on Sturzenegger's whereabouts was at the Property. (R. at 245, ^f 48.) At no
time while performing the Work did Ron Case Roofing have a telephone number where
Sturzenegger could be reached or any other means of contacting her. (R. at 245, ^ 49.)
Ron Case Roofing, using its best judgment, and pursuant to provision 13 of the
Contract,3 determined that the substrate needed new sheeting to support the new built-up
tar and gravel roof system and the material and equipment loads that would be
encountered during the installation of the system. (R. at 245, ^ 53.) Ron Case Roofing
installed new 7/16" OSB sheeting over the existing roof deck, which provided a
3u

If a problem should arise and workmen cannot contact Customer, Contractor
will proceed with job utilizing Contractor's best judgment. In the event that
additional costs are incurred by Contractor under these circumstances, Customer
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satisfactory roof deck surface for installation of the new built-up tar and gravel roof
system. (R. at 246, ^ 54.)
The terms of the Contract provide in pertinent part that "[s]heeting will be
inspected for damage and replaced if needed at $1.59 per square foot." (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R.
at 246, If 55.) At trial, Dan Holland, the expert for Ron Case Roofing, testified that $1.59
per square foot was a reasonable amount to be charged for the sheeting. (R. at 246, f 56.)
This was the only amount to which he testified. Mr. Holland also opined that the
installation of new roof sheeting for the substrate was appropriate. (R. at 363:155.)
Similarly, Kraig Clawson, the expert for Sturzenegger, testified that $1.59 per square foot
was on the high end of a reasonable amount to be charged for the sheeting. (R. at 246, ^
56; R. at 363:217-18, 228-29.) Mr. Clawson also testified that if one were to contract
with a roofing contractor for replacement of the sheeting over an entire roof deck, the
price would not typically be $1.59 per square foot, but he did not provide any further cost
figures as to this issue. (R. at 363:218.) Mr. Clawson testified that he did not have
enough information to form an opinion as to whether the sheeting should have been
replaced. (R. at 363:226-27.) The trial court even stated in its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law that "there was no evidence presented as to a different amount that
should have been charged for the sheeting, other than the $1.59 per square foot amount
set forth in the Contract, for the sheeting.55 (R. at 246, ^ 57.)

authorizes Contractor to proceed with the project and agrees to pay any increase in
costs.55 (Ex. 6; R. at 10, f 13; R. at 245, % 50.)
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Sturzenegger has never asserted facts going to waiver, modification, or any other
basis for the trial court's interference with the clear and unambiguous terms of the
Contract. Notwithstanding the express provisions of the Contract and the weight of the
evidence, the trial court made the legal conclusion that Sturzenegger should be required
to pay only $1.25 per square foot for the sheeting, instead of $1.59 per square foot as the
Contract provides and to which the parties agreed. (R. at 255, Tf 8.) This finding
obviously incorrect and should be reversed because the express contract was integrated
and unambiguous and the agreement of the parties should not be disturbed without
evidence supporting the trial court's interference.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE
ADJUSTED DUE TO THE INCREASED SUCCESS RON CASE ROOFING
OBTAINS ON APPEAL, AND RON CASE ROOFING IS ENTITLED TO
ITS ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.
With the increased success Ron Case Roofing obtains on appeal, this Court should

proportionally adjust the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs because Ron Case
Roofing ultimately prevails to a greater extent on its claims. Ron Case Roofing does not
dispute that the trial court was entitled to determine an award of attorney fees and costs to
Ron Case Roofing as the prevailing party.
Ron Case Roofing submitted an affidavit of attorney fees in the amount of
$25,599.00 on or about September 19, 2005. (R at 263.) Sturzenegger did not object to
the affidavit. Nevertheless, the trial court ultimately awarded Ron Case Roofing only
$10,000.00 in attorney fees. (R at 295.) In making the award, the trial court stated that it
discounted the amount of awarded because "while plaintiff prevailed on the basic claim,
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there were a number of aspects of plaintiff s claim and defendants' counterclaim that
were not fully won by the plaintiff." (R at 295.) The trial court also discounted the
award because "given the amount of the claim and the actual result obtained, the initial
attorney's fees claimed appeared to be excessive." (R at 295.) Clearly, the issues now on
appeal, including prejudgment and postjudgment interest, mechanic's lien foreclosure,
damages offsets, and contract interpretation, must have factored into the trial court's
determination of Ron Case Roofing's success and the actual result obtained. With these
reasons for the award in mind, it is only proper for the trial court award of attorney fees
to Ron Case Roofing to be increased to reflect the additional success Ron Case Roofing
obtains on appeal.
Furthermore, Ron Case Roofing explicitly requests its attorney fees for bringing
this appeal because its action was brought to enforce the Contract. "A party seeking to
recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth
the legal basis for such an award." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The legal basis for an
award of attorney fees to Ron Case Roofing arises from the Contract. Specifically, "a
provision for payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by
the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to enforce the
contract." Mgmt Servs. Corp. v. Dev. Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980). Also,
"[t]he general rule is that when a party who received attorney fees below prevails on
appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Brown v.
Richards. 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Contract includes a provision for
payment of attorney fees to the prevailing party. (Ex. 6; R. at 10, ^ 2; R. at 253, % 98.)
25

The trial court found that Ron Case Roofing was the prevailing party below. (R. at
363:240.) Accordingly, because Ron Case Roofing's action was to enforce the Contract,
including the attorney fee provision for the prevailing party, Ron Case Roofing is entitled
to its attorney fees on appeal as well as at trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons contained herein, Ron Case Roofing respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's legal conclusions with regard to the award of interest, lien
foreclosure, the damages offsets, and interference with the contract. Additionally, Ron
Case Roofing respectfully requests an award of its attorney fees and costs on appeal, in
addition to an adjustment of the trial court's award of attorney fees to which Ron Case
Roofing is entitled in relation to its additional success on appeal.
DATED t h i s ^ 5 ^ a y of May, 2006.

BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK

Jason H. Robinson
Adam T. Mow
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

ADDENDUM
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Final Judgment
Proposal and Contract No. 3R3074S
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SEP 1 4 2005

Robert F. Babcock, #0158
Jason H. Robinson, #8075

SALTWWfCptlNTY

BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK

XT

505 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-7000
Facsimile: (801) 531-7060

DepirtyClork

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

RON CASE ROOFING & ASPHALT
PAVING, L.L.C, a Utah limited liability
company,
Plaintiff,
vs.

|

PEGGY ANN STURZENEGGER a/k/a
PEGGY ANN JOHNSON
STURZENEGGER, an individual;
CLARENCE GENE STURZENEGGER,
an individual; and JOHN DOES 1-10,

Case No.: 030923024
Honorable John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

On Tuesday, August 2, 2005, the above-captioned action came before the
Honorable Judge John Paul Kennedy on a bench trial. Plaintiff Ron Case Roofing &
Asphalt Paving, L.L.C. ("Ron Case Roofing") was represented by Jason H. Robinson
of

BABCOCK SCOTT

& BABCOCK. Defendants Peggy Ann Sturzenegger a/k/a Peggy Ann

Johnson Sturzenegger ("Peggy Sturzenegger") and Clarence Gene Sturzenegger
("Gene Sturzenegger") (collectively the "Sturzeneggers") were represented by Tyler B.
Ayres. Based upon the testimony and evidence presented at trial, and the pleadings,
exhibits and documents on file in the above-referenced action, the Court makes the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
/.

BACKGROUND
1.

Ron Case Roofing was, at all times relevant, properly licensed with the

State of Utah, Department of Commerce, Division of Professional Licensing, as a
roofing contractor.
2.

The Sturzeneggers were, at all times relevant, a married couple.

3.

The Sturzeneggers were, at all times relevant, owners of the subject

detached single-family dwelling located at 1849 East 5600 South in Salt Lake City, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, and further described as LOT 1, LAKEWOOD # 6 SUB.,
Parcel No. 22-16-206-011-0000 (the "Property").
4.

Peggy Sturzenegger is a high school graduate who attended Utah State

University and who holds a Utah realtor's license. Peggy Sturzenegger is not a "babe in
the woods".
5.

As part of obtaining her realtor's license, Peggy Sturzenegger attended

classes where she learned about contracts.
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//.

THE CONTRACT
6.

In or about November 2002, Peggy Stuzenegger solicited proposals from

at least three roofing contractors, including Ron Case Roofing, for roofing services for
the Property.
7.

On or about November 19, 2002, Shain Case, a representative of Ron

Case Roofing, met with Peggy Sturzenegger and observed the existing tar and gravel
roof system at the Property.
8.

Due to the inherent nature of a roof, Shain Case was able to observe only

the surface of the roof. He was unable to observe what lie beneath the tar and gravel
surface; such as the number of existing roof systems (previous roofs applied over the
top of each other) and the condition of the existing substrate. (The substrate is the
underlying wooden deck to which the tar and gravel roof system is applied and which
supports the same).
9.

During the meeting, Shain Case prepared "Proposal and Contract No.

3R3074S" for work to be performed at the Property (the "Contract"), a copy of which
was left with Peggy Sturzenegger for her review and execution. (The Contract was
admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 6).
10.

The Court found that the Contract is fairly straight forward.

11.

The roofing services identified on the Contract included removal of the

existing roofing membrane to the roof deck, installation of a new built-up tar and gravel
3192 03
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roof system, installation of new aluminum gutters and downspouts, installation of new
high rise gravity vents, and installation of a new gravel stop (the "Work").
12.

The estimated price for the Work was $12,450.00 (the "Original Price").

13.

In addition to the Work, the Contract provided for contingencies, such as

the existence of more than one roof system needing to be removed; the substrate
needing new wood sheeting; and other conditions, which will be discussed below.
14.

The contingencies, if encountered, would increase the Original Price.

15.

Peggy Sturzenegger was aware that more than one roof system had been

installed at the Property, but did not disclose this information to Ron Case Roofing.
16.

Peggy Sturzenegger did not invite Ron Case Roofing to inspect the

interior of the Property and did not inform Ron Case Roofing that her master bedroom
had an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling.
17.

Peggy Sturzenegger had the Contract in her possession from November

19, 2003 through April 14, 2003.
18.

Peggy Sturzenegger reviewed the Contract.

19.

On or about April 14, 2003, Peggy Sturzenegger signed the Contract.

20.

Peggy Sturzenegger signed the Contract as "Agent for Owners or Owner".

21.

Provision 1 of the Contract defines the term "Owner" as the "Owner of the

building, owner's architect, general contractor, owner's agent or others acting in behalf
of owner."
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22.

On or about April 14, 2003, Peggy Sturzenegger paid Ron Case Roofing

$6,000.00 as a deposit for the Work.
23.

Peggy Sturzenegger was aware that, pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case

Roofing was to commence the Work within ten business days.
///.

THE WORK AND EXISTING CONDITIONS
24.

On Wednesday, April 22, 2003 (within ten business days), Ron Case

Roofing traveled to the Property to commence the Work.
25.

Ron Case Roofing arrived at the Property with two trucks, a roofing kettle,

at least one dumpster, and other roofing equipment.
26.

The trucks had Ron Case Roofing decals on them.

27.

Ron Case Roofing needed to place a dumpster in the driveway at the

Property.
28.

Ron Case Roofing's foreman knocked on the door of the Property,

introduced himself as a representative of Ron Case Roofing, and asked if there were
any cars in the garage that needed to be moved before Ron Case Roofing placed the
dumpster in the driveway (which would block access to the garage) and commenced
the Work.
29.

Peggy Sturzenegger moved her car so that Ron Case Roofing could

mobilize on the Property and commence the Work.
30.
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31.

Peggy Sturzenegger did not tell Ron Case Roofing where she was going

or when she would return.
32.

Ron Case Roofing personnel believed that Peggy Sturzenegger would be

returning shortly, so they continued mobilizing and commenced the Work.
33.

Peggy Sturzenegger was aware that Ron Case Roofing was mobilizing on

the Property to commence the Work.
34.

Ron Case Roofing subsequently learned that Peggy Sturzenegger was, in

fact, leaving for Hawaii and would be away from the Property for three days. (This was
learned after Peggy Sturzenegger's return from Hawaii).
35.

Peggy Sturzenegger did not inform Ron Case Roofing that she was

leaving for Hawaii and did not instruct Ron Case Roofing to suspend performing the
Work.
36.

Peggy Sturzenegger could have contacted Ron Case Roofing at anytime

to inform them of her travel plans.
37.

The Contract sets forth Ron Case Roofing's office telephone number

(upper left hand corner), office fax number (upper left hand corner), and Shain Case's
personal cell phone number (upper right hand corner).
38.

Ron Case Roofing's office telephone number is also published in the Salt

Lake City telephone directory.
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39.

Provision 21 of the Contract states in pertinent part that the "Contractor

will proceed with the work once it is commenced on a continual basis...."
40.

It is important that roofing work be performed on a continual basis so as to

avoid exposing the open roof to the elements, etc.
41.

There was rainfall around the time Ron Case Roofing performed the Work

and the Extra Work.
42.

Upon removal of the first layer of tar and gravel roofing system, Ron Case

Roofing discovered an additional, previous roof system layer covering the roof surface,
which Ron Case Roofing had to remove.
43.

Provision 10 of the Contract provides: "If tear off is required, this bid price

is based on one roof removal. If more than one roof exists, there will be an added
charge of .45 cents per square foot for each additional roof to be removed."
44.

Upon removal of the tar and gravel roofing systems, Ron Case Roofing

observed the existing roof deck and its condition.
45.

Ron Case Roofing determined that the existing roof deck was in

unsatisfactory condition for installation of the new built-up tar and gravel roof system.
46.

The International Building Code, which has been adopted by Utah,

provides at Section 1510.2 as follows:
Structural and construction loads. Structural roof components shall be
capable of supporting the roof-covering system and the material and
equipment loads that will be encountered during installation of the system.
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47.

At the time of this determination, Peggy Stuzenegger was not at the

Property and could not be otherwise contacted.
48.

At the time of this determination, no one having information on Peggy

Sturzenegger's whereabouts was at the Property.
49.

At no time while performing the Work did Ron Case Roofing have a

telephone number where Peggy Sturzenegger could be reached or any other means of
contacting her.
50.

Provision 13 of the Contract provides as follows:

If a problem should arise and workmen cannot contact Customer,
Contractor will proceed with job utilizing Contractor's best judgment. In
the event that additional costs are incurred by Contractor under these
circumstances, Customer authorizes Contractor to proceed with the
project and agrees to pay any increase in costs.
51.

Because Peggy Sturzenegger was unavailable, Shain Case, of Ron Case

Roofing, took photographs of the roof, using a digital camera, so that Ron Case Roofing
could show Peggy Sturzenegger that there was more than one roof system on the
Property and that the substrate was in poor condition and in need of new sheeting.
52.

Ron Case Roofing's foreman was present when the photographs of the

roof at the Property were taken.
53.

Ron Case Roofing, using its best judgment, determined that the substrate

needed new sheeting to support the new built-up tar and gravel roof system and the
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material and equipment loads that would be encountered during the installation of the
system.
54.

Ron Case Roofing installed new 7/16" OSB sheeting over the existing roof

deck, which provided a satisfactory roof deck surface for installation of the new built-up
tar and gravel roof system.
55.

The terms of the Contract provide in pertinent part: "Sheeting will be

inspected for damage and replaced if needed at $1.59 per square foot."
56.

At trial, both experts testified that $1.59 was a reasonable amount to be

charged for the sheeting.
57.

At trial, there was no evidence presented as to a different amount that

should have been charged, other than the $1.59 amount set forth in the Contract, for
the sheeting.
58.

In addition to removing the extra roof system and installing the new

sheeting, Ron Case Roofing determined, using its best judgment, that the following
extra work needed to be performed:
A.

Upon removal of the evaporative cooler from the roof, Ron Case

Roofing discovered that the existing metal base upon which the evaporative
cooler sits had rusted out and was inadequate to support the evaporative cooler.
Ron Case Roofing constructed and installed a box to support the evaporative
cooler.
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B.

During the Work, Ron Case Roofing discovered that three large

pipe flashings had rusted out and were in need of replacement. Ron Case
Roofing replaced these three large pipe flashings with new large pipe flashings.
C.

During the Work, Ron Case Roofing discovered that behind the

roof fascia at a corner of the Property a portion of the wood had rotted away.
Ron Case Roofing furnished new wood and performed carpentry work to repair
this area of the roof.
D.

Peggy Sturzenegger requested three extra downspouts. Ron Case

Roofing furnished these three extra downspouts.
E.

Ron Case Roofing was required to furnish an extra dumpster at the

Property to contain and haul away the construction debris.
59.

The work described in paragraphs 42 through 58 is hereinafler sometimes

referred to as the "Extra Work".
60.

The Extra Work performed by Ron Case Roofing increased the Original

Price, as provided for by the Contract.
61.

On or about Friday, April 25, 2003, Ron Case Roofing completed the

Work and the Extra Work, pursuant to the terms of the Contract.
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IV.

THE BILLING STATEMENT
62.

On or about April 25, 2003, Shain Case provided to Peggy Sturzenegger a

billing statement (the "Billing Statement"). (The Billing Statement was admitted into
evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 10).
63.

The Billing Statement states a balance due of $16,578.00 for the Work

and Extra Work, as follows:
! $12,450.00
$1,800.00
$7,314.00
$285.00
$267.00
$85.00
$177.00
$200.00
($,6000.00)
$16,578.00
64.

Original Price for Work
Tear off and remove 4,000 square feet of extra roofing at .45 cents per
square foot
Install 4,600 square feet of sheeting at $1.59 per square foot
Construct and install cooler box
Install three extra large pipe flashings
Perform extra carpentry work
Furnish and install three extra downspouts at $59.00 each
Furnish an extra dumpster
Down payment
Total principal balance owed
Peggy Sturzenegger has not paid to Ron Case Roofing any of the Invoice

balance of $16,578.00.
65.

Peggy Sturzenegger admitted in her Answer to Ron Case Roofing's

Complaint that some monies are owed to Ron Case Roofing for the Work. See
Answer, Tf 22 ("Admits that an amount is due Ron Case Roofing.")
V.

THE MASTER BEDROOM DAMAGE
66.

The master bedroom of the Property had an exposed vaulted, wood,

tongue-and-groove ceiling.
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67.

As explained above, Peggy Sturzenegger did not inform Ron Case

Roofing that she had an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling in her master
bedroom.
68.

She also did not invite Ron Case Roofing to inspect the interior of the

Property.
69.

Provision 19 of the Contract provides in pertinent part:

Unless Customer requests Contractor's employee to inspect the interior
surfaces of the building before roofing is commenced by Contractor it will
be assumed that the interior damages were caused prior to
commencement of roof work by Contractor and owner agrees to hold
Contractor harmless for such damages.
70.

When Ron Case Roofing personnel inspected the roof of the Property,

they had no reason to know that there was an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove
ceiling over the master bedroom.
71.

Most homes have insulation above the ceiling. The insulation is typically

installed in the interior of the home in the void under the roof substrate and above the
ceiling. With an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling, there is no such void.
Consequently, there is typically a layer of rigid insulation installed on the exterior of the
home over the top of the roofs substrate.
72.

The Property did not have a layer of insulation on the roof over the master

bedroom.
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73.

The nails used for installation of the new sheeting pierced the master

bedroom ceiling.
74.

When Ron Case Roofing began installing a new roof vent, it cut through

the master bedroom ceiling and discovered that the master bedroom had an exposed
vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling.
75.

On or about April 25, 2003, Peggy Sturzenegger returned to the Property

and saw the condition of the master bedroom ceiling.
76.

Peggy Sturzenegger contacted Shain Case regarding the condition of the

master bedroom ceiling.
77.

Provision 17 of the Contract states in pertinent part that if there is u[a]ny

damage caused by Contractor for which Contractor may be liable . . . , Contractor shall
be given first opportunity to repair said damage before other Contractors are retained
by owner."
78.

On or about June 13, 2003, Ron Case Roofing, through counsel and by

letter, communicated to the Sturzeneggers' attorney, its readiness and willingness to
repair the master bedroom ceiling pursuant to provision 17 of the Contract. (The letter
was admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 12).
79.

Ron Case Roofing suggested several options for repairing the master

bedroom ceiling.
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80.

Ron Case Roofing estimated that its cost to repair the master bedroom

ceiling would be $1,500.00.
81.

Peggy Sturzenegger refused to allow Ron Case Roofing make any repairs

to the master bedroom ceiling.
82.

Peggy Sturzenegger also refused to allow Ron Case Roofing to perform

any clean-up work related to the master bedroom ceiling.
83.

On or about July 29, 2003, Peggy Sturzenegger contracted with Scorpion

of Salt Lake ("Scorpion") to make repairs to the master bedroom ceiling in exchange
for payment in the amount of $3,000.00.
84.

Provision 16 of the Contract provides that "[n]o cost of service, materials,

or goods supplied by owner or owner's agent, Contractor, or employees shall be
charged back against Contractor's invoice, unless such services, goods, or materials
were furnished to Contractor or its employees, pursuant to Purchase Order issued by
Contractor."
85.

Peggy Sturzenegger never requested a Purchase Order for use of

Scorpion to repair the master bedroom ceiling, and a Purchase Order was never issued
by Ron Case Roofing for such.
86.

On or about July 29, 2003, Scorpion of Salt Lake made the repairs to the

master bedroom ceiling.
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87.

At trial, Ron Case Roofing remained willing to deduct its estimated cost of

$1,500.00 from the outstanding contract balance for the master bedroom ceiling
repairs.
VI.

THE ALLEGED LEAK
88.

In March of 2004, Peggy Sturzenegger contacted Ron Case Roofing

regarding an alleged leak in the roof at the Property.
89.

On or about March 18, 2004, Ron Case Roofing inspected the roof at the

Property for leakage by disbursing water on the roof.
90.

After Ron Case Roofing began disbursing water on the roof, Peggy

Sturzenegger demanded that Ron Case Roofing stop its inspection, claiming she was
concerned about her water bill.
91.

At trial, Ron Case Roofing's expert testified that the leak complained of by

Peggy Sturzenegger was not a problem with the roof system installed by Ron Case
Roofing.
92.
VII.

At trial, there was no evidence presented that the roof was still leaking.

THE MECHANIC'S LIEN
93.

Because Ron Case Roofing was not paid in full for the Work and Extra

Work, it caused a Notice of Mechanic's Lien to be filed against the Property (the
"Lien"), a copy of which is attached to Ron Case Roofing's Complaint as Exhibit "B".
94.
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95.

The Lien was mailed to the Sturzeneggers, by certified mail, at the

Property on June 13, 2003.
96.

The Sturzeneggers received the certified mailing at the Property and on or

about June 18, 2003, and Gene Sturzenegger signed for the same.
VIII.

INTEREST
97.

Provision 2 of the Contract states in pertinent part as follows:

In the event payments are not timely made, a finance charge of 3% per
month will be charged on the unpaid balance from the date of completion
to the date of payment before and after judgment.
IX.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
98.

Provision 2 of the Contract states in pertinent part as follows:

Customer agrees to pay all cost of collection and attorney's fees after
default and referral to attorney and further agrees to pay after judgment
costs of collection.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The foregoing Findings of Fact are incorporated herein by this reference.
/.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: BREACH OF CONTRACT
1.

Ron Case Roofing was, at all times relevant, a licensed contractor.

2.

Pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case Roofing agreed to perform the Work

for the Original Price of $12,450.00.
3.

Peggy Sturzenegger agreed to pay the amount of $12,450.00 for the

Work.
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4.

In addition to the Work, the Contract provided for contingencies including,

but not limited to, the following:
A.

If there was more than one roof system, Peggy Sturzenegger

agreed to pay .45 cents per square foot for removal of the same.
B.

If the existing substrate needed new sheeting, Peggy Sturzenegger

agreed to pay $1.59 per square foot for the replacement of the same.
C.

If there were problems requiring extra work, and Ron Case Roofing

was unable to contact Peggy Sturzenegger, Peggy Sturzenegger agreed that
Ron Case Roofing could proceed with the work, using its best judgment, and
Peggy Sturzenegger agreed to pay for any such work so performed.
5.

At trial, Ron Case Roofing claimed it was owed the following amounts:

1
2

$12,450.00
$1,800.00

3
4
5
6
7
8

$7,314.00
$285.00
$267.00
$85.00
$177.00
$200.00
($,6000.00)
($1,500.00)
$15,078.00
6.

Original Price for Work
I
Tear off and remove 4,000 square feet of extra roofing at .45 cents I
per square foot
Install 4,600 square feet of sheeting at $1.59 per square foot
Construct and install cooler box
Install three extra large pipe flashings
Perform extra carpentry work
Furnish and install three extra downspouts at $59.00 each
Furnish an extra dumpster
Down payment
Ron Case Roofing's estimated cost to repair master bedroom ceiling
Total principal balance owed

The Court found that Ron Case Roofing performed the Work and the

Extra Work set forth in the Billing Statement, as outlined above.
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7.

The Court found that Ron Case Roofing was entitled to the full amounts

sought, and set forth above in paragraph 5, with the exception of items 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
8.

As to item number 3, the Court found that Peggy Sturzenegger should be

required to pay $1.25 per square foot for the sheeting, instead of $1.59 per square foot
as set forth in the Contract.
9.

As to items 4-7, the Court found that Peggy Sturzennger should not be

required to pay for the same.
10.

The Court found that Ron Case Roofing is entitled to the following

principal amounts under its breach of contract cause of action:
$12,450.00
$1,800.00
$5,750.00
$0
$0
$0
$0
$200.00
($,6000.00)
($1,500.00)
| $12,700.00
11.

Original Price for Work
I
Tear off and remove 4,000 square feet of extra roofing at .45 cents
per square foot
Install 4,600 square feet of sheeting at $1.59 per square foot
Construct and install cooler box
Install three extra large pipe flashings
Perform extra carpentry work
Furnish and install three extra downspouts at $59.00 each
Furnish an extra dumpster
Down payment
Ron Case Roofing's estimated cost to repair master bedroom ceiling
Total principal balance owed
The Court found that failure to pay Ron Case Roofing the amounts

referenced above in paragraph 10, when they became due and owing, constitutes a
material breach of contract for which Ron Case Roofing is entitled to recover.
12.
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13.

Pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case Roofing is entitled to an award of its

costs of collection, including attorney fees.
//.

OFFSET
14.

Peggy Sturzenegger claimed offsets for the damage to her master

bedroom ceiling and for alleged deficiencies in the roof system installed by Ron Case
Roofing.
A.

Master Bedroom Ceiling.

15.

Ron Case Roofing had a right, pursuant to the Contract, to repair the

damage to the master bedroom ceiling.
16.

Ron Case Roofing requested that it be allowed to repair the damage to

the master bedroom ceiling.
17.

Peggy Sturzenegger refused to allow Ron Case Roofing to repair the

damage to the master bedroom ceiling.
18.

The Court found that Peggy Sturzenegger went off and did her own thing.

19.

There was no evidence presented at trial that the $3,000.00 paid by

Peggy Sturzenegger for repair of the master bedroom ceiling was a reasonable amount.
20.

The Court, using "Kentucky windage" numbers granted Peggy

Sturzenegger an offset of $2,400.00 (which included the $1,500.00 that Ron Case
Roofing voluntarily deducted from its claim as its estimated cost to repair the master
bedroom ceiling).
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B.

Deficiencies with Roof System.

21.

The Court found that there were certain deficiencies with the roof system

installed by Ron Case Roofing.
22.

There was no evidence presented at trial as to the dollar value of the

deficiencies.
23.

The Court, using "Kentucky windage" numbers, granted Peggy

Struzenegger an offset of $1,500.00.
24.

With the offsets, set forth above, the Court found that Ron Case Roofing

is owed the principal amount of $10,264.00.
///.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: UNJUST ENRICHMENT/ QUANTUM MERUIT
(in the alternative to the first cause of action for breach of contract)
25.

Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, Peggy Sturzenegger requested that

Ron Case Roofing perform the Work and the Extra Work.
26.

Ron Case Roofing performed the Work and the Extra Work.

27.

The Work and Extra Work benefited and improved the Property and

conferred a benefit upon Peggy Sturzenegger and the Property.
28.

Ron Case Roofing performed the Work and the Extra Work with the

expectation of being compensated for the reasonable value thereof and has not acted
as a volunteer or intermeddler.
29.

To permit Peggy Sturzenegger and the Property to retain the benefit of

the Work and Extra Work without compensating Ron Case Roofing for the same would
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result in unjust enrichment of Peggy Sturzenegger and the Property at the expense of
Ron Case Roofing, which should not be allowed.
30.

The reasonable value of the Work and Extra Work, less the offsets set

forth above, is $10,264.00.
IV.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: FORECLOSURE OF LIEN
31.

Ron Case Roofing performed the Work and the Extra work at the request

of Peggy Sturzenegger.
32.

The Court found that Peggy Sturzenegger was the "owner" of the

Property.
33.

Ron Case Roofing's Complaint provides, at paragraph 5, as follows:

Peggy Sturzenegger entered into a contract with Ron Case Roofing, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" (the "Contract"), to have
certain roofing work, as set forth in the Contract, performed for an existing
detached single-family dwelling situated upon real property owed by the
Sturzeneqqers and located at approximately 1849 East 5600 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, and more specifically described as follows:
LOT 1, LAKEWOOD #6 SUB.
Parcel No. 22-16-206-011-0000
(Emphasis added).
34.

Peggy Sturzenegger, in her Answer to Ron Case Roofing's Complaint,

admitted the allegations set forth in paragraph 5 of Ron Case Roofing's Complaint
35.

Gene Sturzenegger, in his Answer to Ron Case Roofing's Complaint,

admitted the allegations set forth in paragraph 5 of Ron Case Roofing's Complaint.
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36.

At trial, Ron Case Roofing's counsel explained, based upon the Complaint

and Answer filed in the above-captioned action, that the Sturzeneggers admitted that at
all relevant times they were both owners of the Property.
37.

Ron Case Roofing's counsel also explained that the Sturzeneggers had

not amended their respective Answers.
38.

The Sturzeneggers did not attempt to amend their respective Answers at

39.

The Court took judicial notice of the Sturzeneggers' admission that they

trial.

were, at all times relevant, both owners of the Property.
40.

Counsel for the Sturzeneggers stipulated that the Court could take judicial

notice of the Sturzeneggers' admission that they were, at all times relevant, both
owners of the Property.
41.

Based upon the Court's taking take judicial notice of the Sturzeneggers'

admission that they were, at all times relevant, both owners of the Property, Ron Case
Roofing's counsel forwent questioning the witnesses regarding ownership and authority
to contract under Utah's mechanic's lien statute.
42.

Ron Case Roofing caused the Lien to be recorded on June 13, 2003,

within ninety days of Ron Case Roofing's last date of performing work on the Property,
in compliance with Utah Code Section 38-1-7.
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43.

Ron Case Roofing sent a copy of the Lien, by certified mail, to Mr.

Sturzenegger on June 13, 2003, within thirty days of the date the Lien was filed, in
compliance with Utah Code Section 38-1-7.
44.

Ron Case Roofing filed the instant foreclosure action on October 17,

2003, within 180 days of its last work, in compliance with Utah Code 38-1-11.
V.

JUDGMENT LIEN
45.

The Court found that Ron Case Roofing is entitled to a judgment lien

against the Property.
46.

The judgment lien shall relate back to and take effect as of April 22, 2003,

and shall be superior to and have priority over, as a matter of time and right, any and all
encumbrances recorded against the Property subsequent thereto.
47.

The judgment lien shall attach to any and all interest held in and to the

Property by Peggy Sturzenegger and/or Gene Sturzenegger.
48.

Ron Case Roofing shall not be allowed to execute on its judgment lien

against the Property.
49.

Ron Case Roofing may, however, execute against any other property and

may use all other legal means of and methods for collecting its Judgment.
50.

Ron Case Roofing will be allowed to execute on its judgment lien against

the Property in the event the Property is ever sold or otherwise transferred.
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DATED this
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NOTICE TO PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL
You are hereby notified that pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(f)(2), any
objections to these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law shall be filed within five (5)
days of service hereof, together with any additional time provided for by Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 6(e). Upon the earlier of being served with an objection to the proposed
order or expiration of the time to object, counsel for Plaintiff will file these Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law with the Court.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

p7^h

hereby certify that on this 4 ^ day of August, 2005, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served by the method indicated below, to the following:
Tyler B. Ayres
3267 East 3300 South, #126
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RON CASE ROOFING & ASPHALT PAVING, :
L . L . C , a Utah limited liability
company,
:

FINAL .JUDGMENT
CASE NO.

030923024

Plaintiff,
vs.

FILED DISTRICT COURT

PEGGY ANN STURZENEGGER, aka
:
PEGGY ANN JOHNSON STURZENEGGER, an
individual; CLARENCE GENE
:
STURZENEGGER, an individual; and
JOHN DOES 1-10,
:
Defendants.

;

"

Third Judicial District

QQJ 4 9 «fin,'* *""')
SALT LAKE coytfp?
IJT <—

**

Deputy Clerk

E N T E R E D IN R E G I S T R Y

OF JUDGMENTS , .
prrE.

On Tuesday, August 2, 2005, the above-captioned action came before
the Honorable John Paul Kennedy on a bench trial.

Plaintiff Ron Case

Roofing & Asphalt Paving, L.L.C. ("Ron Case Roofing7') , was represented
by Jason H. Robinson of Babcock, Scott & Babcock.

Defendants Peggy Ann

Sturzenegger, aka Peggy Ann Johnson Sturzenegger ("Peggy Sturzenegger")
and Clarence Gene Sturzenegger ("Gene Sturzenegger") (collectively the
"Sturzeneggers") were represented by Tyler B. Ayres.
The Court, having reviewed all pleadings and Memoranda on file in
the above-captioned action and the authorities cited therein, having
taken evidence, having considered the arguments of counsel, and having
made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and being fully advised in
the premises, hereby orders, adjudges and decrees, as follows:
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ATTORNEYS FEES
The Court has received and carefully reviewed plaintiff's claim for
attorney's

fees.

Based upon the amount of time devoted and the

determination of the Court as to a reasonable hourly rate, the Court has
awarded $10,000.

The Court discounted the amount awarded for the

following reasons: first, while plaintiff prevailed on the basic claim,
there were a number of aspects of plaintiff's claim and defendants'
Counterclaim that were not fully won by the plaintiff; second, given the
amount

of

the claim and the actual result obtained,

the initial

attorney's fees claimed appeared to be excessive; and third, some of the
time claimed

(e.g., for trial preparation and related matters) also

appeared to be excessive.
JUDGMENT
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Ron Case Roofing and against
defendant Peggy Sturzenegger, as follows:
Principal

$10,264.00

Costs

487.65

Attorney's fees

10,000.00
Total Judgment

$20,751.65

IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 15-1-4(3), that
interest shall accrue at the rate of 4.82% per annum from the date this
Judgment is entered until this Judgment is paid in full.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that this judgment shall be augmented in the
amount of reasonable costs and attorney fees expended in collecting said
Judgment, as shall be established by Affidavit.
JUDGMENT LIEN
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDEREDr that this Judgment shall be a Judgment
lien on and against that certain real property located at approximately
1849 East 5600 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and more specifically
described as follows:
LOT 1, LAKEWOOD #6 SUB.
Parcel No. 22-16-206-011-0000
(the ^Property") . The Judgment lien shall relate back to and take effect
as of April 22, 2003, and shall be superior to and have priority over,
as a matter of time and right, any and all encumbrances recorded against
the Property subsequent thereto.

The Judgment lien shall attach to any

and all interest held in and to the Property by Peggy Sturzenegger and/or
Gene Sturzenegger.
Ron Case Roofing shall not be allowed to execute on its Judgment
lien against the Property unless and until such time as the Property is
sold or otherwise transferred.

In the meantime, however, Ron Case

Roofing may execute on and against any other real and personal property
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and may use all other legal means of and methods for collecting its
Judgment.
Dated this

/ ^ ^ day of October, 2005

RON CASE ROOFING
V. STURZENEGGER

PAGE 5

FINAL JUDGMENT

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Final Judgment, to the following, this.
2005:

Robert F. Babcock
Jason H. Robinson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
505 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Tyler B. Ayres
Attorney for Defendants
3267 East 3300 South, Suite 126
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

_day of October,

'vn(JaAe
1969
ALL \ \
TYPES °

PROPOSAL AND CONTRACT NO.

THIS DOCUMENT, INCLUDING THE PROVISIONS
ON THE REVERSE HEREOF, WHEN EXECUTED
CONSTITUTES A BINDING AND THE TOTAL AGREEMENT.

ROOFING &

ASPHALT PAVING L.L.C.
P.O. BOX 70161
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84170
(801)973-7663
(801)886-2272 FAX
RRED BY
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we existing rooting membrane to sheeting as indicated above and hauled away. Sheeting will be inspected
amage and replaced if needed at % Z~f per square foot per !4 inch thick. Install new built up and gravel
ig, including new gravel stop on edge, as indicated above. If primary structure is in good condition, new roof,
properly maintained, should have a life-expectancy of 20 years. Our warranty is for two years on
nanship. No other warranties are expressed or implied. One-half of the contract price is payable as down
ient before the work is scheduled. The balance of the contract price is payable immediately upon completion,
irf5onditions:'2^z^4 7 jz^7r7t^—'/Pi^T**
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1 uwner means uwner or ounaing owners arcnueci general contractor owners ageni or otners acting in Denair or owner
2 Terms are payment of 1/2 down and balance in full immediately upon completion of the work In the evenl payments are not timely ma
finance .rnarge of 3% per month will be charged on the unpaid balance from the date of completion to the date of payment before and after i
ment>% Customer agrees to pay all cost of collection and attorney's fees after default and referral to attorney and further agrees to pay after I
ment cost of collection
'
3 Tender of payment with checks or other negotiable instruments bearing words purporting to release all liens and/or fully satisfying the out*
ing contract balance, when the amount shown on such instrument is less than the full amount of the contract balance, shall be nuB and voii
shall constitute a breach of this agreement Contractor shall be entitled to present such instruments for payment without regard to such w<
or legend and shall be entitled to pursue the balance of its claim or otherwise
4 In the event the Customer sells, mortgages, or otherwise tiansfers or encumbers said premises, total amount of contract herein provided
become immediately due and payable as to any and all amounts then unpaid, without necessity of any notice by then owner and holder of cor
By the terms of this agreement customer hereby irrevocably assigns the amount due to contractor and directs any escrow agent or purcha
honor this agreement
5 In the event the premises herein above described shall be destroyed or damaged by fire or other cause prior to the payment in full <
contract herein provided for, and the Customer shall become entitled to receive insurance by virtue thereof, Contractor shall subrogate to the
to the customer for the balance then due on said contract, the insurance proceeds from any insurance companies liable to make such pay
6 Customer waives all benefit of homestead and other exemption now or hereafter in force, together with the benefit of all statutes that m
conflict with this agreement
7 Customer realizes heavy equipment must be used to complete work and gives Contractor permission when necessary, to park or drive e
grass concrete blacktop etc , at Customer's own risk and will not hold Contractor liable for damages
8 Contractor will not be liable for damages to any part of the interior of the building or its contents which may arise from leaks of any t
either before during or after roof has been applied
9 This contract does not include repairs to gutters, downspouts pipes, metal flashings, or modifications by verbal agreements unless exp
stipulated in the specifications
10 If tear off is required, this bid price is based on one roof removal
per square foot for each additional roof to be removed

If more than one roof exists there will be an added charge of 45

11 Warranty All roof repairs with set bid price guaranteed for a period of 90 days unless special one year guarantee is issued All guars
begin on completion date Contractor agrees to repair any defect from faulty workmanship for the period of guarantee at no charge to pr<
owner Non-Payment of the contract balance for more than 30 days after completion or substantial completion voids all warranties express
implied AH time and materials repairs have no warranties expressed or implied
12

All work will be done according to our best practices, to our specifications, and may vary as much as 45% of specification

13 If a problem should arise and workmen cannot contact Customer Contractor will proceed with job utilizing Contractor's best judgemer
the event that additional costs are incurred by Contractor under these circumstances. Customer authorizes Cor tractor to proceed with the p
and agrees to pay any increase in costs
14

Starting dates are estimated and are subject to availability of supplies, weather, and Contractor's workload

15 Customer or agent shall not withhold payment to Contractor for alleged claim against Contractor or its employees
submitted to Contractor's liability insurance carrier for resolution

All such claims sh

16 No cost of services, materials , or goods supplied by owner or his agent, Contractor, or employees shall be charged back against Contra
invoice, unless such services, goods, or materials were furnished to Contractor or its employees, pursuant to Purchase Order issued by Co
tor
17 Any damage caused by Contractor for which Contractor may be liable and which requires repair services or materials customarily provtc
Contractor, Contractor shall be given first opportunity to repair said damage before other Contractors are retained by owner
18 Payment for this agreement will be made in full when due and all payments shall reflect Contractor as payee Payments made to any
payee snail be at risk of Customer and may void any warranty if for any reason, Contractor does not receive full payment for the job A
repairs or maintenance during warranty period or warranted roofs must be done by Contractor to maintain Contractor's warranty
19 Unless Customer requests Contractor's employee to inspect the interio. surfaces of the building before roofing work is commenced by
tractor it will be assumed that interior damages were caused prior to commencement of roof work by Contractor and owner agrees to hold Cc
tor harmless from such damages
20 In the event Customer defaults in payment of the contract price Customer assigns all rents and profits from the premises upon whu
work was performed until Contractor is paid in full
21 Contractor will proceed with the work once it is commenced on a continual basis, subject, however, to unavoidable delays due to inci
weather, strikes, availability of materials specified by owner or agent and conditions commonly referred as acts of God
22

Oral request for change shall not be binding on Contractor unless reduced to writing by signed Change Order

23

Owner agrees to obtain and pay for all permits, licenses, fees and other cost required for the performance of this Contract

24 Owner represents that the roof surface to be worked on by Contractor shall be free from impediments which may interfere with Contra
performance of this Contract Any obstruction such as air conditioners, ducts, vents, pipes, conduits, wires, heating coils, heaters and oth
jects which obstruct Contractor's performance shall be the sole responsibility of owner and Contractor shall be relieved of all claims for d
or loss to such objects or arising as a result of necessity to remove or install such objects or the necessity to work around such obstrucl
25 Any agreement to arbitrate disputes between Contractor and any other party shall be at the expense of the party seeking arbitration
party requesting arbitration shall arrange for an arbitration hearing to be held within thirty (30) days from demand for final payment In the
that the arbitration hearing is not held within thirty (30) days heretofore referred to, Contractor shall be relieved of any and all obligations t
trate and may elect to initiate legal action to secure payment of such claims
26 Owner shall not use Contractor's equipment to gain access to or descend from any roof or building or any other portion of the realty
use is strictly prohibited by Contractor Any use of Contractor's equipment of any kina shall be at owner's ru»k and owner waives all habi
injury, loss, or damage which may occur as a result of any such vise
27 The parties agree that the prevailing party in any lawsuil arising from or as a result of this agreement, whether the action is based
contractual provisions or on any other theory of liability, shall be entitled to an award of attorney's fees costs including witness fees , profe<
experts fees and such other cost to prosecute or defend any action described above
28

Customer grants permission for Contractor to put a sign on property until work is completed

29

This proposal is based on roof deck being in ready condition and requiring no additional^ preparation pripr^ to roof application (i^e ^sn

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this Mp day of May, 2006, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served by the method indicated below, to the following:
Tyler B. Ayres
3267 East 3300 South PMB 126
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

p^U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
• Hand Delivered
• Overnight Mail
• Facsimile

